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Artificial-noise-aided Secure Multicast Precoding
for Directional Modulation Systems
Feng Shu, Ling Xu, Jiangzhou Wang, Wei Zhu, and Zhou Xiaobo
Abstract—In multi-cast scenario, all desired users are divided
into K groups. Each group receives its own individual confiden-
tial message stream. Eavesdropper group aims to intercept K
confidential-message streams. To achieve a secure transmission,
two secure schemes are proposed: maximum group receive
power plus null-space (NS) projection (Max-GRP plus NSP) and
leakage. The former obtains its precoding vector per group by
maximizing its own group receive power subject to the orthogonal
constraint, and its AN projection matrix consist of all bases
of NS of all desired steering vectors from all groups. The
latter attains its desired precoding vector per group by driving
the current confidential message power to its group steering
space and reducing its power leakage to eavesdropper group
and other K − 1 desired ones by maximizing signal to leakage
and noise ratio (Max-SLNR). And its AN projection matrix is
designed by forcing AN power into the eavesdropper steering
space by viewing AN as a useful signal for eavesdropper group
and maximizing AN to leakage-and-noise ratio (Max-ANLNR).
Simulation results show that the proposed two methods are
better than conventional method in terms of both bit-error-rate
(BER) and secrecy sum-rate per group. Also, the leakage scheme
performs better than Max-GRP-NSP , especially in the presence
of direction measurement errors. However, the latter requires no
channel statistical parameters and thus is simpler compared to
the former.
Index Terms—directional modulation, multicast, confidential
message, security, artificial-noise.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the recent several years, physical-layer security in wire-
less networks has attracted more and more research activities
from both academia and industry [1]–[6]. In [1], the author’s
pioneer research work has laid a foundation for physical-layer
security. As a physical layer secure transmit technique in line-
of-propagation (LoP) channel, directional modulation (DM)
has made rapid progress in many aspects by using antenna
array with the help of aided artificial noise (AN) [7]–[13].
To enhance security, the symbol-level precoder in [8] was
presented by using the concept of constructive interference
in directional modulation with the goal of reducing the energy
consumption at transmitter. In the presence of direction mea-
surement error, the authors in [12], [13] proposed two new
robust DM synthesis methods for two different application
scenarios: single-desired user and multi-user broadcasting by
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fully exploiting the statistical properties of direction mea-
surement error. Compared to existing non-robust methods,
the proposed robust methods can achieve at least an order-
of-magnitude bit error rate (BER) performance improvement
along desired directions. In general, the DM in LoP channel
might harvest a high performance gain along the desired
directions via confidential-message beamforming and degrades
the performance of eavesdroppers at undesired directions with
the help of AN projection operation. Finally, the goal of secure
transmission is realized.
[7], [14] established a unified framework for physical layer
multi-casting to multiple co-channel groups, where multiple
independent data streams are transmitted to groups of users by
the multiple antennas. If one group of eavesdropper appears,
then how to achieve a secure transmission in such a situation is
an interesting and important research topic. This secure prob-
lem includes twofold: the privacy protection among desired
groups and the leakage of all confidential messages from all
desired groups to the group of eavesdroppers. We will address
this topic from the standpoint of physical layer security by
using DM in this paper, where the LoP channel is considered
and two precoding and AN projecting schemes for this multi-
cast communications will be proposed.
The remainder are organized as follows: Section II de-
scribes the system model in multi-cast scenario. Two AN-aided
precoding schemes are proposed in Section III. Section IV
presents the simulation results. Finally, we make conclusions
in Section V.
Notations: throughout the paper, matrices, vectors, and
scalars are denoted by letters of bold upper case, bold lower
case, and lower case, respectively. (·)T , (·)∗ and (·)H denote
transpose, conjugate, and conjugate transpose, respectively.
Matrices IN denotes the N × N identity matrix and 0M×N
denotesM ×N matrix of all zeros. tr(·) denotes matrix trace.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Fig. 1 plots the schematic diagram of a multi-cast multiuser
directional modulation system in LoP channel with perfect CSI
konwledge. In this system, there is one base station (BS), K
groups of desired users, and one group of eavesdroppers. BS
employs an N -antenna array. Desired group k is composed of
Tk desired users. Eavesdropper group consists of M eaves-
droppers. All users are equipped with a single antenna. In
Fig. 1, antenna array at BS broadcasts K independent streams
of confidential messages to K different desired groups, re-
spectively and securely so that all users in the eavesdropper
group can’t intercept any one of K streams of confidential
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Fig. 1. Schematic diagram of multicast DM system
messages. In Fig. 1, the normalized steering vector for the
ith user of the kth desired group with direction angle θd,ki
is h(θd,ki) = 1/
√
N [ej2piψθd,ki (1), · · · , ej2piψθd,ki (N)]T , where
ψθd,ki(n) = (n − (N + 1)/2)d cos θd,ki/λ with d being
antenna spacing and λ being the wavelength of transmit carrier.
Therefore, the total steering channel matrix for kth desired
group can be defined as
H(θdk) = [h(θdk,1),h(θdk,2), · · · ,h(θdk,Tk)], (1)
where Tk denotes the number of desired users in kth group. In
(1), H(θdk) is an N × Tk matrix. Similarly, the N ×M total
steering channel matrix of the eavesdropper group is given
by H(θe) = [h(θe,1), · · · , h(θe,M )]. The transmit baseband
signal is written as
s = α1β1
√
Ps
K∑
k=1
vkxk + α2β2
√
PsTANz (2)
where xk is the confidential message transmitted to the kth
desired group, vk is the corresponding beamforming vector of
group k for confidential message xk, Ps is the total transmit
power, TAN is the AN projection matrix, and z is the AN
vector, satisfying z ∼ CN (0, IN−∑K
k=1
Tk
). In (2), β1 and β2
are the power allocation factors of confidential message and
AN, with the constraint β21 + β
2
2 = 1. A large value of β1
means that more power is allocated to transmit confidential
messages and less power is used as secure protection. How to
choose the optimal values of β1 and β2 is a hard problem
and depends on application scenarios. Parameter α1 is the
normalized power factor of confidential message satisfying
α21E{
∑K
k=1
∑K
i=1 v
H
i vkxkx
H
i } = 1. To simplify the above
expression, we have α1 = 1/
√
γK, where γ is the nor-
malized factor of signal constellation of digital modulation.
For example, when quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK) is
adopted, γ = 1/
√
2, then α1 = 1/
√
2K. The normalized AN
power factor α2 ensures α2E{tr[TANzzHTHAN ]} = 1, which
can be simplified as α2 = 1/
√
σ2ztr(TANT
H
AN ). When all
N − ∑Kk=1 Tk columns of TAN are orthogonal with each
other and normalized, tr(TANT
H
AN ) = N −
∑K
k=1 Tk. The
received signal vector of desired group k is
y(θdk) = α1β1
√
PsH
H(θdk)vkxk + α1β1
√
PsH
H(θdk)
K∑
i=1,i6=k
vixi + α2β2
√
PsH
H(θdk)TANz+ ndk (3)
where ndk ∼ CN (0, σ2dITk). Similarly, the received signal
vector of the eavesdropper group can be expressed as
y(θe) = α1β1
√
PsH
H(θe)
K∑
k=1
vkxk + α2β2
√
PsH
H(θe)•
TANz+ ne, (4)
where ne ∼ CN (0, σ2eIM ).
III. TWO EFFICIENT SCHEMES OF PRECODING AND AN
PROJECTION
In this section, we will present two methods to design the
confidential message precoding vector vk and AN projection
matrix TAN in (2). The first scheme devises the confiden-
tial message precoder of maximizing group receive power
(Max-GRP) subject to the orthogonal constraint and the AN
projection matrix based on null-space projection (NSP) rule.
The second scheme uses the leakage concept to design both
precoding vectors and AN projection matrix. Due to the use
of the statistical property of AN and channel noise, the latter
provides a better and more robust performance than the former,
which will be confirmed in our simulation section.
A. Proposed Max-GRP plus NSP scheme
Firstly, let us define the complement of
the steering matrix of group k as Hd,−k =[
H (θd1), · · · , H
(
θd(k−1)
)
, H
(
θd(k+1)
)
, · · · , H (θdK)
]
.
Then, the optimization problem of maximizing group receive
power (Max-GRP) of group k is casted as
max
vk
vHk H(θdk)H
H(θdk)vk
subject to HHd,−kvk = 0. (5)
The objective function in (5) denotes the receive power sum-
mation for all users of group k. The constraint HHd,−kvk = 0
means that the confidential message of desired group k will
be transmitted through the corresponding null spaces of all the
remaining desired groups by the optimization variable vk . The
optimization problem in (5) aims to enhance the receive quality
of confidential message for desired group k by maximizing
the receive power sum of all users of group k. To solve the
above problem, channel matrix Hd,−k is first decomposed as
the singular-value decomposition (SVD)
Hd,−k =[
U
(1)
d,−k U
(0)
d,−k
](
Σ
(1)
d,−k 0
0 0
)[
V
(1)
d,−k V
(0)
d,−k
]H
(6)
whereΣ
(1)
d,−k is a Lk×Lk diagonal matrix, andV(0)d,−k consists
of the last (N − Lk) right singular vectors corresponding to
3TABLE I
COMPLEXITY COMPARISON(FLOPS).
Methods Complexity as a function of K Complexity as a function of T
Max-GRP-NSP
O((7T 2N + 3T 3)K2+(−12T 2 − 4TN2 − 3T 3 −NT )K
+(7T 2N + 7TN2 + 2N3 + T 3 +N2 +NT ))
O((3K2 − 3K + 1)T 3+(7K2N − 12KN + 7N)T 2
+(7N2 − 4KN2 +N −NK)T + (N2 + 2N3))
Max-SLNR plus
Max-ANLNR
O(2TN2K + (3MN2 + TN2 + 4N3)) O((2KN2 +N2)T + (3MN2 + 4N3))
BD
O(3T 2NK2+(T 3 − T 2N +MNT + TN
−M2T − 2N2T )K
+(−T 3 + 2M2N −MNT )+(+T 2M − TN +MN +MN2 +N3))
O((K − 1)T 3+(3K2N −KN +M)T 2+
(MNK −MN +KN −N −M2K − 2N2K)T
+(2M2N +MN +MN2 +N3))
N −Lk zero singular values. Define Fk = V(0)d,−k , and vk =
Fkuk, then the optimization problem in (5) is converted into
max
uk
uHk F
H
k H(θdk)H
H(θdk)Fkuk
subject to uHk uk = 1,
(7)
which means that uk is the eigenvector corresponding to
the largest eigenvalue of matrix FHk H(θdk)H
H(θdk)Fk. The
design of vk has been completed. In the following, we design
the AN projection matrix TAN . The basic principle is to
eliminate the influence of AN on the desired user by projecting
AN to the null space of all desired users’ steering vectors from
K groups, which is written as the form HH (θdk)TANz = 0
for all values of k with k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K}, which can also
be written as
[H∗ (θd1), · · · ,H∗ (θdK)]T ·TANz = 0∑K
k=1 Tk×1
. (8)
Let us define HHd =
[
HH (θd1)
∗
, · · · , HH (θdK)∗
]T
, then
the orthogonal condition in (8) is reduced to
HHd TANz = 0∑K
k=1
Tk×1
⇒ TAN = IN−Hd
[
HHd Hd
]−1
HHd .
(9)
The added AN is intended to interfere eavesdroppers, and
the desired user groups receive no AN under ideal channel
knowledge because we project AN onto the null space (NS)
of all desired groups. To guarantee the existence of NS, the
number of transmit antennas should be greater than the sum
of receive antenna numbers of all desired groups of users.
B. Proposed leakage-based method
However, the Max-GRP plus NSP method does not exploit
the effect of channel noise. Now, we consider the design of vk
and TAN by using leakage idea with the help of variance of
channel noise. Here, the confidential-message power of group
k will be allowed to leak out towards other K − 1 desired
groups and eavesdropper one. The corresponding precoding
vector vk is optimized by the rule of maximizing the signal-
to-leakage-and-noise ratio (Max-SLNR)
max
vk
SLNR (vk)
subject to vHk vk = 1
(10)
where
SLNR (vk) =
(
α21β
2
1Pstr
{
vHk H (θdk)H
H (θdk)vk
})
[
tr
(
α21β
2
1Ps
K∑
i=1,i6=k
vHk H (θdi)H
H (θdi)vk+
α21β
2
1Psv
H
k H (θe)H
H (θe)vk + σ
2
dk
)]−1
. (11)
According to the generalized Rayleigh-Ritz theorem,
vk (k = 1, 2, · · · ,K) is the eigenvector corresponding to the
largest eigenvalue of matrix
 K∑
i=1,i6=k
H (θdi)H
H (θdi) +H (θe)H
H (θe) +
σ2dk
α21β
2
1Ps
IN


−1
·
H (θdk)H
H(θdk) (12)
Below, the AN will be regarded as a useful signal to the
eavesdropper group. By optimizing the AN projection matrix
TAN , the leakage of AN power to K desired groups should
be made as small as possible. This idea can be represented as
max
TAN
ANLNR (TAN )
subject to tr
(
TAN
HTAN
)
= N −∑Kk=1 Tk, (13)
which is called Max-ANLNR, where ANLNR stands for AN-
leakage-and-noise-ratio defined by
ANLNR (TAN) =
tr
{
T
H
ANH (θe)H
H (θe)TAN
}
tr
{
THAN
(
K∑
i=1
H (θdi)HH (θdi) +
σ2e
α2
2
β2
2
Ps(N−
∑
K
i=1
Tk)
IN
)
TAN
} ,
(14)
where, similar to Max-SLNR in (10), all columns of AN pro-
jection matrixTAN consists of the eigenvectors corresponding
to the N −∑Kk=1 Tk largest eigenvalues of the matrix given
by
 K∑
i=1
H (θdi)H
H (θdi) +
σ2e
α2
2
β2
2
Ps
(
N −
∑K
k=1
Tk
) IN


−1
·
H (θe)H
H (θe) . (15)
Therefore, we complete the design of the proposed Max-
SLNR plus Max-ANLNR method.
C. Complexity comparison and analysis
In Table I, we list the complexities of our proposed meth-
ods and conventional block diagonalization (BD) method in
[15], respectively. BD is a classic precoding method for
conventional MU-MIMO systems, and performs better than
zero-forcing in terms of sum-rate by allowing multi-antenna
interference among antennas per user. Below, BD is adopted
as a performance benchmark. Here, K stands for the number
of desired groups and T is the number of users per group
with T1 = · · · = TK = T . From this table, it is seen that the
complexities of BD and the proposed Max-GRP-NSP are the
4quadratic function of K and the complexity of the Max-SLNR
plus Max-ANLNR is a linear function of K for fixed values
of M , N and T . The former increases quadratically with K
while the latter increases linearly with K . When M , N and
K are fixed, the complexities of BD and the proposed Max-
GRP-NSP are the cubic function of T and the complexity of
the Max-SLNR plus Max-ANLNR is a linear function. The
former increases cubically with T while the latter increases
linearly with T . In general, N ≥ (KT+M), so the number of
antennas N at transmitter plays a dominant role in complexity.
If we fix the values of K , T , and M , then the complexities of
the three methods are cubic functions of N . In other words,
they have the same magnitude complexity.
IV. SIMULATIONS RESULTS
Below, the performance of the two proposed methods will
be evaluated. Simulation parameters are as follows: d = λ/2,
N = 16, K = 2, T1 = T2 = M = 2, θd1 = {30◦, 45◦},
θd2 = {120◦, 135◦}, β1 =
√
0.9, and QPSK modulation is
used to evaluate the BER performance.
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Fig. 2. BER versus direction angle for two different desired user groups
(SNR=14dB).
Fig. 2 shows the curves of BER versus direction angle of
the two proposed methods for two desired groups, where the
conventional BD method in [15] is used as a performance
reference. Parts (a) and (b) correspond to group 1 and group
2, respectively. It is seen from Part (a) that each BER curve
achieves two local lowest values at the two desired directions
of group 1: 30◦ and 45◦, and rapidly rises up to more than
0.1. Clearly, the BER performances of the proposed two
methods are better than that of BD along the desired directions.
Additionally, the proposed two methods form two BER main
beams around the two desired directions. Outside the two
main beams, the BER performance degrades seriously. In other
words, if eavesdroppers lie outside the two main beam, then
it is extremely difficult for them to recovery the confidential
message stream successfully. Observing Part (a), it is obvious
that the Max-SLNR plus Max-ANLNR performs much better
than the Max-GRP plus NSP at two desired directions. Part
(b) plots the BER performance for group 2. Obviously, the
same performance tendency is observed as Part (a).
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Fig. 3. Group secrecy sum-rate versus SNR for two different desired user
groups.
Fig. 3 illustrates the secrecy sum-rate (SSR) per group
versus SNR of the two proposed methods for two desired
groups. Here, Parts (a) and (b) plot the SSR performance for
groups 1 and 2, respectively. In the two parts, it is evident that
5the proposed two methods achieve an improvement over BD in
SSR per group. From Part (a), it follows that the performance
of the proposed Max-SLNR plus Max-ANLNR is slightly
better than that of the Max-GRP plus NSP in the low SNR
region, and much better than that of the latter in the medium
and high SNR regions. As SNR increases, the performance
gain over the Max-GRP plus NSP achieved by the proposed
Max-SLNR plus Max-ANLNR increases gradually. Similar to
Part (a), the same performance trend is seen in Part (b). To
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Fig. 4. BER versus direction angle for two different desired user groups in
the presence of direction measurement errors (SNR=14dB).
evaluate the impact of direction measurement error on BER
performance, Fig. 4 illustrates the BER performance of the
two methods in the presence of direction angle measurement
errors, where direction angle measurement errors are approxi-
mately modeled and normalized as uniform distributed random
variables in the interval [−∆θmax
BW
, ∆θmax
BW
] with ∆θmax = 5
◦
and BW = 2λ/(Nd), where BW = 2λ/(Nd) denotes the
main beam bandwidth. From Parts (a) and (b), it is seen
that the three methods become worse due to direction angle
measurement errors. However, the proposed methods are more
robust than BD. Comparing Fig. 4 and Fig. 2, we find that
there is an-order-of-magnitude performance loss on BER due
to errors. Further, it is certain that the proposed Max-SLNR
plus Max-ANLNR method performs still better along the
desired directions than the Max-GRP plus NSP, and their BER
performance degrades and shows approximately the same BER
performance outside two main desired beams.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, two secure schemes, Max-GRP plus NSP and
Max-SLNR plus Max-ANLNR, have been proposed for multi-
cast DM scenario. From simulation, we find the proposed
two methods behaves better than BD by means of BER and
SSR per group. The Max-SLNR plus Max-ANLNR scheme
performs much better than the Max-GRP plus NSP in accor-
dance with BER and SSR per group regardless of direction
measurement errors. Also, compared to the Max-SLNR plus
Max-ANLNR, the Max-GRP plus NSP does not need variance
of channel noise, and is simpler. Due to their good security and
low-complexity, the proposed two schemes can be applied to
the near future scenarios like unmanned aerial vehicle, satellite
communications, and mmWave communications.
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